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Telemedicine without frontiers: does the internet
change medical licensing requirements?
Dr Dan Jerker B Svantesson BOND UNIVERSITY
The fact that cross-border e-commerce often gives
rise to complex legal issues is well documented. But
little attention has been given to such issues where
medical services are provided online. Telemedicine is
the term for medical information being transferred by
phone, the internet or other networks for the purpose of
consulting, and sometimes remote medical procedures
or examinations.1
Taking as its point of departure the recently decided
US case Hageseth v Superior Court 2007 CAApp (1st)
54 (the Hageseth case), this article examines the legal
issues associatedwith licensing of cross-border telemedicine.
Background to Hageseth
In Hageseth, a doctor licensed to practice medicine in
Colorado (Dr Hageseth), prescribed drugs for a 19 year
old man, McKay, in California. While under the influ-
ence of alcohol, McKay used the prescribed medicine
(fluoxetine, the generic for Prozac) to commit suicide.
The situation is complicated as Dr Hageseth was physi-
cally located at his home in Colorado when he issued the
prescription over the internet. Further, while he was
aware that McKay’s home was in California, he never
interacted directly with McKay. Dr Hageseth had been
asked by a Florida-based company to assess McKay’s
request for medication and the medicine was shipped
from a pharmacy in Mississippi to McKay in California.
Complicating things further, the website on whichMcKay
ordered the drugs was operated by a company in India.
When he attracted police attention for a minor offence
in Nebraska, Dr Hageseth was extradited to California.
There he argued that the court lacked jurisdiction, as no
part of his conduct took place in California and, in his
view, his act of practising medicine began and ended in
Colorado where he wrote the prescription.
Relevant law
While a situation such as that in the Hageseth case
could arise in both domestic and international settings, it
is important to understand the Californian law in ques-
tion. Under Californian law, as in many other jurisdic-
tions, it is a crime to practice medicine in that state
without a Californian license. More specifically, any
person who:
[P]ractices or attempts to practice, or who advertises or
holds himself or herself out as practicing, any system or
mode of treating the sick or afflicted in this state, or who
diagnoses, treats, operates for, or prescribes for any …
physical or mental condition of any person, without having
at the time of so doing a valid, unrevoked, or unsuspended
certificate as provided in this chapter or without being
authorized to perform the act pursuant to a certificate
obtained in accordance with some other provision of law is
guilty of a public offense, punishable by a fine not
exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), by imprisonment
in the state prison, by imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding one year, or by both the fine and either imprisonment.2
Further, Californian Penal Code permits the punish-
ment of a defendant under Californian law for any
criminal act committed in whole or in part in California:
“persons are liable to punishment under the laws of this
state … who commit, in whole or in part, any crime
within this state”.3
Importantly, Californian law encompasses the prin-
ciple of objective territorial jurisdiction (effects doc-
trine); that is, when a crime is committed outside but
consumed inside jurisdiction, then court can claim
jurisdiction:
When the commission of a public offense, commenced
without the State, is consummated within its boundaries by
a defendant, himself outside the State, through the inter-
vention of an innocent or guilty agent or any other means
proceeding directly from said defendant, he is liable to
punishment therefore in this State in any competent court
within the jurisdictional territory of which the offense is
consummated.4
Judgment
In light of the law as outlined above, the court
concluded that the Californian court could claim juris-
diction:
A preponderance of the evidence shows petitioner pre-
scribed medication for a resident of this state, aware of the
virtual certainty his conduct would cause the prescribed
medication to be sent to that person at his residence in
California. This state is thus the place where the crime is
“consummated”. The fact that other parts of the crime were
committed elsewhere is immaterial, as there is no consti-
tutional or other reason “that prevents a state from punish-
ing, as an offense against the penal laws of such state, a
crime when only a portion of the acts constituting the crime
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are committed within the state”. (People v. Botkin (1908) 9
Cal App 244, 251 [98 P. 861].) Accordingly, respondent
court possesses the necessary jurisdiction.5
This outcome may have been both logical and desir-
able. However, care must be taken in where we view the
practice of medicine as taking place. If we had con-
cluded that Dr Hageseth practiced medicine only in
Colorado, he could not have come under the jurisdiction
of a Californian court. However, also viewing his
conduct as taking place in California has an undesirable
implication. In such a case, Dr Hageseth’s conduct may
not be regulated by the Medical Board of Colorado.
Consequently, it is submitted that the solution lies in
concluding that in doing what he did, Dr Hageseth
practiced medicine in both Colorado and California.
This is no stranger than the fact that a telephone
conversation between a person in California and one in
Colorado takes place at both places — there is no need
to identify a single location — or, at least, the disadvan-
tages of identifying a single location outweigh the
advantages of doing so.
Alternatively, the rules of the license issuing author-
ity must make clear that the doctor’s conduct, wherever
it is carried out, is regulated by the authority.6
Does the internet change the situation?
Interestingly, the court in Hageseth acknowledged
that, under certain circumstances, internet technology
may be different enough to warrant novel legal interpre-
tations, and that it is for the defendant to prove that it
was so. This is certainly a step in the right direction, and
it is submitted that every time a court is faced with a case
involving internet use, it must consider whether the
application of established legal principles to that tech-
nology constitutes the mere application of those prin-
ciples or an actual widening of the scope of those
principles. In many cases, this can be done in a summary
fashion and will take little of the court’s time. In other
cases, it will be a complex task requiring a solid
understanding of internet technology.
In this context, it is interesting to revisit how the High
Court approached the internet in the famous Gutnick7
case. Kirby J recognised the novel features of the
internet and stated that:
Intuition suggests that the remarkable features of the
internet (which is still changing and expanding) makes it
more than simply another medium of human communica-
tion. It is indeed a revolutionary leap in the distribution of
information, including about the reputation of individuals.8
In sharp contrast, Callinan J stated:
The internet, which is no more than a means of communi-
cation by a set of interconnected computers, was described,
not very convincingly, as a communications system entirely
different from pre-existing technology.9
It will be interesting to see which of these views
prevails in coming years.
In arguing that the internet made his situation differ-
ent to offline situations, Dr Hageseth presented three
arguments, all of which were criticised by the court.
First, Dr Hageseth argued that he lacked notice of the
unlawfulness of his conduct, and consequently it would
be unfair to find that he has to defend the action in
California.10 On this issue, the court noted that the
Californian approach of requiring a license is neither
obscure nor unusual and that particularly a licensed
medical practitioner ought to be aware of this approach.11
Second, Dr Hageseth suggested that claiming juris-
diction will not deter others from unlawful conduct.12 In
response, the court pointed to the absence of national
and international regulation, which it argued meant that
states need to regulate.13
Third, Dr Hageseth asserted that the court claiming
jurisdiction in this situation will deter telemedicine.14
The court did not agree.15
The Hageseth case highlights the significant compli-
cations that face telemedicine due to the limited geo-
graphical reach of medical licensing schemes. It should
be clear that telemedicine can never reach its full
potential unless these complications are addressed.
Australian law
It is interesting to consider how a similar case would
have been decided in Australia. Like the US, Australia
has rules regulating the practice of medicine. While
regulation takes place at state level, there is a great
degree of national uniformity due to the fact that all
Australian jurisdictions have similar statutory require-
ments for the registration of health care professionals.16
Looking at Queensland, s 161(2) of the Medical Practi-
tioners Registration Act 2001 is comparable to s 2052 of
the Californian Business and Professions Code that is of
central importance in the Hageseth case:
A person who is not a registrant must not, by means of any
conduct in contravention of subsection (1)—
(a) under colour or pretence of being registered under
this Act or of being eligible to be registered under
this Act—
(i) obtain any employment; or
(ii) obtain access to a hospital, clinic, medical
practice or other place; or
(iii) carry out, or purport to carry out, a surgical
operation, procedure or treatment; or
(iv) conduct, or purport to conduct, a medical
consultation with a person or a medical exami-
nation of a person; or
(v) diagnose, or purport to diagnose, an illness or
the absence of an illness; or
(vi) prescribe or recommend a drug, vitamin, herb
or other medication, substance, treatment, rem-
edy or cure for an illness; or
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(vii) perform or provide a medical service or pur-
port to perform or provide a medical service;
or
(viii) sign, or give to a person, a medical document
or document that purports to be a medical
document; or
(ix) conduct, or purport to conduct, an autopsy or
post mortem examination or otherwise diag-
nose or determine, or purport to diagnose or
determine, a cause of death or the circum-
stances relating to a death; or
(b) offer, promise or agree to do anything mentioned in
paragraph (a); or
(c) charge, recover or retain a fee or other consideration
for doing or purporting to do, or promising or
agreeing to do, anything mentioned in paragraph (a);
or
(d) claim, recover or retain a fee or other consideration
from a health insurance fund or other entity for doing
or purporting to do, or promising or agreeing to do,
anything mentioned in paragraph (a).
Maximum penalty — 2000 penalty units or 3 years
imprisonment.
Several Australian states have similar rules of crimi-
nal jurisdiction to the relevant Californian rules in the
Hageseth case.17 For example, s 10C of the Crimes Act
1900 of NSW extends criminal jurisdiction to offences
committed wholly outside the state, provided that the
offence has an effect in the state. Similarly, s 12 of the
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) states that:
Where an event occurs in Queensland caused by an act
done or omission made out of Queensland which, if done or
made in Queensland, would constitute an offence, the
person who does the act or makes the omission is guilty of
an offence of the same kind and is liable to the same
punishment as if the act or omission had occurred in
Queensland.
In light of this, it seems that a situation such as the
Hageseth case could arise also in (at least parts of)
Australia. However, unlike the US, Australia has a
well-developed system of mutual recognition of regis-
trations:
Under the Mutual Recognition Act 1992 (Cth) health care
professionals registered in one state or territory only need
to give notice (including evidence of home registration) and
pay the prescribed fee to the relevant registration authority.18
Consequently, had the Hageseth case taken place in
Australia, Dr Hageseth could have given notice to the
patients’ states and paid the relevant fee prior to issuing
the prescription, and thereby presumably avoided any
problems.
At the same time, it must be noted that in the case of
a medical practitioner based outside Australia providing
medical services to a patient in Australia, the mutual
recognitions system would obviously not protect the
practitioner.19
Conclusion
This article has highlighted some licensing or regis-
tration complications that may arise in the context of
cross-border telemedicine. The Hageseth case is a very
clear illustration of the risks that health care practitio-
ners take when engaging in cross-border telemedicine.
The discussion suggests that the Australian approach
of mutual recognition of registrations is a good way of
avoiding these complications in the domestic health care
market. At the same time, it is also clear that significant
harmonisation efforts are required on an international
level if cross-border telemedicine is to reach its full
potential.
Dr Dan Svantesson,
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law,
Bond University.
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